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23 FEB 1965

TCS - Rights

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT: Project WUNDERST

REFERENCES: a) WPS Memo to DD/P, 22 Dec. 64;
Reconsideration of CIA's acceptance
of JCS Maritime UV Requirements

b) DD/P Memo to Chairman, JCS, 29 Dec. 64;
Unconventional Warfare Planning

*from
CPSD -*

*True but
no purpose
of AF +
boring regime*
1. As stated in References, there is common agreement
within the CS that WUNDERST external agent assets do not meet
JCS wartime UV requirements. As a consequence the JCS have
undertaken a re-examination of the problem of requirements,
and it is our understanding that the DC Division has sus-
pended further recruitment and training of agent reservists
to meet these requirements.

2. Two basic questions have come out of these develop-
ments. First, there is the question of what use can be
made of the existing WUNDERST agent reservists in current
operations; and, more importantly, there is the question
of what future use can be made of the WUNDERST mechanism.

3. As regards the agent reservists now on the WUNDERST
rolls, in our view certain limiting factors inhibit their
general usefulness in contingency operations.

*75%
25%*
No alternative
Agree.

a. All of these agents have been recruited to
serve in a Hot War situation in areas related to their
ethnic origin. It has already been determined that
some are willing to serve in other operations in capac-
ties and some are not. Agents in this latter category
obviously have no utility in current operations, and,
while it may be expedient to hold them on the rolls
until the matter of JCS wartime requirements has been
resolved, it would appear to be clearly evident now
that they should be released if as a result of the JCS
review there is no longer a requirement for any agents
willing to serve in a Hot War capacity.

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b. All of these agents have been trained primarily for employment behind enemy lines in wartime. Their utility in a covert or clandestine role during the Cold War, therefore, will require some reorientation and retraining. The WMDR mechanism, as a separate entity, is not required in order to accomplish this. The regular training establishment NE has that capability.

c. Most, if not all, of these agents are U. S. citizens which means that where the U. S. flag must be concealed they can be used only with the utmost circumspection, and then in situations only where there is little risk of capture or operational compromise. Actually, when U. S. policy permits the use of U. S. citizens, and language or other requirements are not overriding, certain categories of U. S. Special Forces personnel or REMUS personnel could be used with greater operational utility.

4. Despite these limitations, an effort is being made to utilize qualified ~~WMDR~~ agent reservists in current operations. Recently an attempt to place twenty of these agents with AF for use in the Congo is an example of this effort, and it also is an example of one of the problems encountered. We are prepared to continue this effort either to place these agents in current operations, or possibly to absorb them under some other project, if policy permits use of this category of U. S. citizens.

5. In regard to the future utility of the WMDR mechanism and the WMDR concept, this is decidedly discouraging as far as considering this activity as a separate project to meet future Cold War requirements. In the two Area Divisions (AF and AF) now faced with urgent needs for contingency agents, there are political and operational security reasons which severely limit the recruitment of agent reservists within the U. S. So far unforseen contingencies assignments. There are many valid operational reasons for these limitations, and CDD is basically in agreement with the position which the Divisions have taken. Apart from the Area Divisions, CDD has its own requirements for contingency agents; but here again, through our own projects

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we already have devised the means, or are in process of devising the means, for satisfying those requirements more directly and more effectively than can be done through WORMATE. In these circumstances we cannot foresee any new Cold War requirements being levied on WORMATE.

C. We all recognize, of course, that within the over-all WORMATE mechanics there are facilities and personnel, apart from the agent assets, which have a utility that transcends the bounds of the WORMATE project. Pending a resolution of the current JCS review of Hot War requirements, we feel the NMWPOC mechanism per se should not be dismantled. If the JCS determine that there is no longer a need for the products of the WORMATE project as now constituted, it is recommended that it should be terminated in its existing form. It is recommended that the future disposition of the existing facilities and the training personnel be a matter of negotiation with CSC. It is the view of SOD that Pickett has a considerable utility to the CSC. Reassignment of the remaining personnel should be handled by the appropriate Career Service.

|| How?
|| We are
already
mentioning
it!

Major General, USA
Chief, Special Operations Division

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